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A TALE OF TWO SYSTEMS: HONG KONG VS. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
By 
Peter Klein* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 On May 16, 2008, FG Hemisphere Associates (“Hemisphere”) initiated a 
suit in Hong Kong against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“the DRC”).1 
The second, third, and fourth defendants were companies incorporated in Hong 
Kong. The state-owned China Railway Company Limited, the fifth defendant, 
collectively owned those companies.2 Hemisphere sought an injunction to prevent 
these Chinese companies from paying concession fees to the DRC, who were in 
the midst of launching a large investment program in the DRC. As part of that 
program, they had to pay the DRC entry fees for mineral exploitation rights. As the 
holder of an award against the DRC, Hemisphere went after the entry fees in an 
“equitable execution of the arbitral awards.”3  
  
II.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 This case began as a simple business deal in the 1980s between the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Energoinvest, a company based in 
Yugoslavia.4 Energoinvest was to help finance the construction of a “hydro-
electric facility and high-tension electric transmission lines in the DRC.”5 The 
credit agreements between the two parties included International Chamber of 
                                                 
* Peter Klein is a 2012 Juris Doctor candidate at the Pennsylvania State University, 
Dickinson School of Law. 
1 FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Democratic Republic of the Congo & Others, CACV 
373/2008 & CACV 43/2009,  (10 February 2010) [hereinafter FG Hemisphere].  
2 Id. at ¶ 9. 
3 Id. at ¶ 8. 
4 Id. at ¶ 3. 
5 Id.  
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Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration clauses. The DRC defaulted on its payment and 
Energoinvest commenced arbitral proceedings. 
 Energoinvest launched separate arbitral proceedings in Switzerland and 
France. Both tribunals issued their decisions on April 30, 2003, awarding 
Energoinvest “US$11.725 and US$22.25 million respectively plus interest.”6 The 
DRC did not challenge either award and Energoinvest eventually assigned its 
awards to Hemisphere in 2004.7 
 FG Hemisphere Associates is a limited liability company that focuses on 
“investing in emerging markets and distressed assets” and its principal place of 
business is in New York State.8 Energoinvest assigned the entire award against the 
DRC, including interest, to Hemisphere on November 16, 2004.9 In its attempt to 
collect award, Hemisphere sued the DRC in other jurisdictions, accumulating 
US$2.783 million of the award.10 At the time of the current proceedings, the DRC 
owed Hemisphere US$102,656,647.96.11 
 Hemisphere filed an ex parte application for leave to enforce the judgment 
in Hong Kong. On May 15, 2008, Justice Saw issued the following orders: 
 
(a) the second, third, and fourth defendants be restrained 
from making payments (the entry fees) allegedly due 
from them to the DRC and/or Congo Mining under the 
joint-venture agreement up to a maximum of US$104 
million; 
(b) the DRC be restrained from receiving the entry fees up 
to that maximum sum; 
                                                 
6 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 4. 
7 Id. at ¶ 6   
8 Id. at ¶ 5.  
9 Id. at ¶ 6. 
10 Id. at ¶ 7. 
11 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 7  
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(c) the plaintiff have leave to enforce in Hong Kong the two 
arbitration awards the parties should attend a judge in 
chambers on a date to be fixed to hear an application by 
the plaintiff for the appointment of receivers by way of 
equitable execution to receive the payments.12 
 
The DRC acknowledged receipt of the originating summons on June 16, 2008, “for 
the sole purpose of disputing jurisdiction and for the avoidance of doubt” insisting 
that “nothing . . . shall be construed as waiver of any rights of Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.”13 On July 7, 2008, the DRC moved to preclude the ruling 
of the Court of First Instance, claiming that the court had no jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the claim or the remedy sought, that there had been no service on 
the DRC, and to ensure “the discharge of the various orders thus far made against 
the DRC.”14 On August 23, 2008, the Court of First Instance gave Hemisphere 
leave to include the China Railway Group, Limited as a fifth defendant and to 
serve notice on the DRC’s Hong Kong solicitors. On November 12, 2008, the 
court granted the Secretary for Justice leave to intervene in the proceedings.15 The 
hearings took place in November and December 2008. Justice Reyes rendered 
judgment on December 12, 2008. The issues presented before the Court of First 
Instance were: 
 
(1) whether on and after 1 July 1997 Hong Kong common 
law recognized the doctrine of restrictive immunity 
whereby a state could not lawfully be impleaded in the 
courts of this jurisdiction in relation to acts in its 
sovereign capacity (acta jure imperii) but was not 
                                                 
12 Id. at ¶ 11. 
13 Id. at ¶ 14. 
14 Id. at ¶ 16. 
15 Id. at ¶ 18. 
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immune from suit in respect of those of its acts of a 
private law or commercial character (acta jure gestionis) 
or whether, on the other hand, immunity from suit in this 
jurisdiction was absolute; 
(2) if the restrictive doctrine applied, into which category 
the relevant act in this instance fell; and 
(3) if immunity was absolute or the relevant act was in any 
event an act jure imperii, whether the DRC had waived 
immunity by submitting itself to arbitration.16 
 
Judge Reyes concluded that the court “had no jurisdiction over the DRC in these 
proceedings; discharged the ex parte injunction against the DRC . . . and set aside 
leave to enforce the arbitral awards . . . ”17 On February 29, 2009, Judge Reyes set 
aside the injunctions against the Chinese companies set to invest in the DRC. 
Hemisphere appealed these two judgments. 
 
III.  THE PRESENT CASE 
 
The DRC, with the support of the Chinese government, claimed absolute 
immunity from the enforcement of any arbitral action. The issue of immunity 
became the salient point in the proceedings as the courts of Hong Kong grappled 
with whether they should apply the doctrine of restrictive immunity, or its less 
forgiving counterpart, absolute immunity. Running parallel to that inquiry was the 
question of whether the DRC waived its right to sovereign immunity by agreeing 
to refer any disputes under its contract with Energoinvest to arbitration under the 
rules of the ICC. In a split opinion, The Court of Appeal of Hong Kong held that 
Hong Kong was a restrictive immunity jurisdiction and, therefore, had the 
                                                 
16 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 20. 
17 Id. at ¶ 24. 
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authority to enforce an arbitral award against the DRC. The court then ruled that 
agreeing to arbitration does not waive a sovereign state’s immunity.18   
 
IV.  WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY APPLIES TO HONG 
KONG COURTS 
 
 Whether Hong Kong employs the doctrine of restrictive immunity 
represented the central issue to this claim. The DRC contended that restrictive 
immunity was not a custom of international law, nor was it part of Hong Kong law 
at any point in its history. In response, Hemisphere asserted that restrictive 
immunity rose to the level of customary international law and, as such, became 
part of Hong Kong common law prior to the July 1, 1997 transfer of sovereignty to 
China (Prior to the transfer, Hong Kong was a British Colony).19 Prior to the 
transfer, Hong Kong was a British Colony. The Chinese government, intervening 
solely on the question of sovereign immunity, insisted that China employed 
absolute sovereign immunity. The Chinese government’s position would require 
Hong Kong to apply the doctrine of absolute immunity, as Hong Kong is subject to 
Chinese sovereignty.20 To answer this question, the Court of Appeal: 1) looked to 
customary international law and whether the doctrine of incorporation applied 
those customs to Hong Kong prior to the 1997 handover, and 2) whether the 
common law in Hong Kong survived the transfer of power to China. 
  
A.  Customary International Law 
 
 The court looked to a number of cases in international law to discern the 
current custom of state immunity. Judge Stock, in writing the majority opinion, 
placed great emphasis on R (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Prague 
                                                 
18 Id. at ¶ 180.  
19 Id. at ¶ 50. 
20 Id. at ¶ 51. 
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Immigration Officer in defining what constituted a custom of international law.21 
Lord Bingham, author of the opinion in Prague Immigration Officer, cited the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Laws of the 
United States, 3d (1986).22 The restatement considers customary only those rules 
that states follow “from a sense of legal obligation.”23 Additionally, agreements 
between states can become customary international law when those “agreements 
are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.”24 
 The court found agreement for this analysis in The North Sea Continental 
Shelf case, which reasoned that the consent of a “generality of states” creates 
custom.25 This led the court to conclude that a custom “accepted as law by the 
international community generally . . . [crystallizes] into customary international 
law . . . (even though) not every [s]tate observes the custom and accepts it as 
law.”26 State action, such as ministerial statements and treaties, must demonstrate a 
“belief on the part of [s]tates that the practice is obligatory as a matter of law.”27 
 With this in mind, the court had to decide whether state immunity, a 
specter in international arbitration for private individuals, remained absolute or if 
the doctrine of restrictive immunity had become a custom of international law. 
 
B.  Restrictive Immunity as Customary Law 
 
The legal maxim par in parem non habet imperium (equals do not have 
authority over one another) has influenced English common law since the early 
                                                 
21 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 56. 
22 Id. (quoting R (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Prague Immigration Officer [2005] 
A.C. 1). 
23 Id. at ¶ 56.   
24 Id.  
25 Id. at ¶ 57, (quoting The North Sea Continental Shelf Case [1969] ICJ Rep. 3). 
26 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 57. 
27 Id. at ¶ 60. 
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twentieth century.28 “. . . The courts of a state will not implead a foreign sovereign, 
that is, they will not make it party to legal proceedings against its will, whether the 
proceedings involve process against the sovereign or seek to recover from it 
specific property or damages.”29 
The court acknowledged that the absolutist approach to sovereign 
immunity eventually withered as national governments waded into international 
commerce and now “[n]early every country . . . engages in commercial 
activities.”30 Accordingly, whether or not state-led commercial activity eviscerates 
the legal custom of absolute immunity was ultimately unimportant to the court. 
The court instead determined that the salient point was one of fairness.31 Was it fair 
to allow states to press their claims against private companies in courts while 
simultaneously prohibiting private companies, or individuals, from pressing claims 
against states? The majority thought not: “in acting in a private law or commercial 
capacity, the State divests itself of its sovereign character . . .”32   
 The majority did not see the move toward restrictive immunity as a trend 
away from absolute immunity, but rather a step toward leveling the playing field.33 
The court stressed that absolute immunity will always signify the starting point, 
holding that by “acting in a private law or commercial capacity, the state divests 
itself of its sovereign character.”34 Therefore, the court reasoned that an “inquiry 
by a court in the forum state is not then an inquiry into an act of sovereignty.35 For 
Justice Stock, however, whether or not countries around the world accepted the 
                                                 
28 Id. at ¶ 29. 
29 Id. at ¶ 61 (quoting The Cristina [1938] A.C. 485). 
30 Id. at ¶ 64 (quoting Trendtex Trading Corp v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 
(CA)). 
31 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 65. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at ¶ 65.  
35 Id. 
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doctrine of restrictive immunity as a custom of international law was ultimately 
irrelevant.36   
Rather, the relevant issue was the nature of the English common law and 
how it flowed to Hong Kong prior to the reunification of July 1 1997.37 In 1979, 
Britain extended the State Immunity Act of 1978 to Hong Kong, which allowed 
two exceptions to absolute immunity: 1) where the state submitted to the court’s 
jurisdiction or, 2) where the government engaged in commercial activity.38 In I 
Congresso and Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, the House of Lords brought the 
common law position in-line with the statutory provisions of the State Immunity 
Act; “(We have) adopted the so-called restrictive theory of state immunity under 
which acts of a commercial nature do not attract state immunity . . .”39 
 Justice Stock dismissed the fact that Hong Kong had no precedents of her 
own regarding restrictive and absolute immunity.40 Instead, he reasoned that Hong 
Kong courts would not have contradicted the decisions of the House of Lords, 
which enjoyed “great authority” in Hong Kong.41 While he conceded the difficulty 
in ascertaining Hong Kong’s common law on this issue, the influence of the House 
of Lords and English precedent proved that “the common law of Hong Kong as at 
30 June 1997 recogni[z]ed the doctrine of restrictive immunity.”42   
 
C.  Remnants of the Common Law in Post-Colonial Hong Kong 
 
 The Hong Kong common law remained intact following the transfer of 
sovereignty to China on July 1, 1997.43 Article 8 of the Basic Law provided for the 
                                                 
36 FG Hemisphere at ¶65 
37 Britain formally handed Hong Kong back to the People’s Republic of China on this date. 
38 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 69. 
39 Id. at ¶ 71 (quoting Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1573, at 1584 (H.L.)). 
40 Id. at ¶ 77 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at ¶ 78. 
43 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 79. 
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continuation of the common law, “except for any (laws) that contravene this Law, 
and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (“SAR”).”44 Article 19 addressed the judiciary specifically 
in requiring that “the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region . . . be vested 
with independent judicial power,” and that the “courts of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as 
defen[s]e and foreign affairs.”45 What China failed to do, Justice Stock pointed out, 
was enact “local legislation to replace the State Immunity Act 1978 as extended to 
Hong Kong or to alter the common law position” to reflect China’s position on 
sovereignty.46   
 The transfer of power left a statutory void that the State Immunity Act of 
1978 had previously filled.47 To start retroactively filling that void, the government 
of China sent two letters to the Hong Kong courts demonstrating The People’s 
Republic of China’s historical commitment to absolute sovereignty.48 It is in this 
instance that Hong Kong’s motto, “One Country, Two Systems” becomes most 
problematic. As a common law territory, the PRC government does not necessarily 
bind Hong Kong, and as such, the PRC letters were only advisory, bringing the 
court’s attention to the PRC’s tradition of absolute sovereignty and its dominion 
over foreign affairs.49 While giving the letters their due respect, Justice Stock 
ultimately saw no indication that refusing the DRC full immunity and enforcing 
the awards against it “would affect an infringement of the sovereignty of the 
PRC.”50 
 While not conceding the argument to the plaintiffs, the PRC Secretary for 
Justice argued that, based on the PRC’s two letters, even if the doctrine of 
                                                 
44 Id. at ¶ 79; HKSAR Basic Law, Art. 8. The Basic Law is the constitution of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. 
45 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 79 (citing The Basic Law, Art. 19). 
46 Id. at ¶ 80. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at ¶ 86. 
49 Id. at ¶ 88. 
50 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 118. 
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restrictive immunity blossomed into customary international law, China’s long-
standing commitment to absolute immunity in the face of this trend proscribed the 
enforcement of the custom in China.51 In international law, persistent, unwavering 
objection at the outset of the formation of a new custom exempts that country from 
fulfilling that new custom’s obligations.52 This compelling argument is muddied 
by China’s signature to the 2004 United Nations Convention, which endorsed the 
doctrine of restrictive immunity.53 
 In assessing the impact of China’s signature to the UN Convention, Justice 
Stock consulted the two letters sent by China.54 These letters explained that China 
had not yet ratified the Convention.55 The second letter addressed the UN 
Convention explicitly, maintaining China’s opposition to the doctrine of restrictive 
immunity and stressing China’s refusal to ratify it.56 Hemisphere responded by 
pointing to other multilateral conventions to which China is a party and where the 
PRC softened its hostility toward restrictive immunity.57 Hemisphere contended 
that these treaties demonstrated China’s less than steadfast opposition to restrictive 
immunity; without complete, unwavering objection to the custom, China could not 
claim exemption.58 
 The Chinese Secretary for Justice argued that China’s apparent 
inconsistency was not inconsistent at all.59 Even though the PRC has historically 
objected to accepting the doctrine of restrictive immunity as customary 
international law, it has always condoned strategic decisions to waive immunity 
when it suits them.60 This argument persuaded Justice Yeung, the lone dissenter. 
                                                 
51 Id. at ¶ 97. 
52 Id. at ¶ 89. 
53 Id. at ¶ 91. 
54 Id. at ¶ 86. 
55 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 91. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at ¶ 107. 
58 Id. at ¶ 93.  
59 Id. at ¶ 109. 
60 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 109. 
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 Justice Yeung pointed out that Hong Kong, per the Basic Law, is “an 
inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.”61 As such, Hong Kong’s 
common law only applies where the domestic law does not.62 Thus, “[t]he absolute 
immunity doctrine, adopted by the PRC as part of its international legal obligation, 
applies to the Hong Kong SAR.”63 Justice Yeung then took this argument to its 
logical conclusion, asserting,  
 
[w]hen it comes to foreign affairs of which state immunity is 
one aspect, there is simply no room for ‘two systems’ at all. 
Hong Kong SAR courts, having regard to the provisions of 
the Basic Law, should not adopt a legal position concerning 
state immunity incompatible with the position of the PRC.64  
 
Justice Yuen, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the general notion that issues 
of state immunity inhere to the domain of “foreign affairs.”65 
 Justice Yuen urged that “[s]tate immunity . . .  not be regarded as solely 
executive-driven, as simply an act in a state’s conduct of its relations with foreign 
states, but as a matter of law which falls to be decided by the courts of the forum 
state.”66 As the forum state here was Hong Kong, Justice Yuen went on to support 
the conclusion that Hong Kong’s common law survived the transfer of sovereignty 
to China.67 
 Justice Yuen also pointed to the lack of federal legislation reversing Hong 
Kong’s common law custom of restrictive immunity after 1997.68 This did not 
surprise Justice Yeung, as Hong Kong had long been a “centre of international 
                                                 
61 Id. at ¶ 219 (quoting the HKSAR Basic Law, Art. 1). 
62 Id. at ¶ 219. 
63 Id. at ¶ 224. 
64 Id. at ¶ 226. 
65 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 249. 
66 Id. at ¶ 249. 
67 Id. at ¶ 260. 
68 Id. at ¶ 260.  
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commerce” and China would have been smart to avoid disrupting the flow of 
international trade.69 Like the plaintiffs, Justice Yuen suggested that China’s 
signature to the 2004 UN Convention and its readiness to waive absolute immunity 
in recent treaties evidenced a slow reversal toward the acceptance of restrictive 
immunity.70   
 Vice President Stock echoed Judge Yuen’s sentiments. Had China wanted 
Hong Kong to adopt the doctrine of absolute immunity, “that intention would 
(have) be[en] given effect by legislation.”71 Furthermore, these two judges agreed 
that allowing Hong Kong to employ restrictive immunity would not adversely 
affect the decision-making abilities of the PRC.72 The PRC had shown continued 
commitment to the absolute doctrine, notwithstanding its noticeable, yet subtle, 
move toward the restrictive doctrine, and would continue to be able to do so.73  
Indeed, Justice Stock did “not see application of the restrictive doctrine in this case 
as prejudicing such objection as the PRC might . . . advance in the future.”74 
 The court concluded that the common law as it existed in Hong Kong in 
1978 included the doctrine of restrictive immunity.75 Hong Kong reverted back to 
the common law after the transfer back to China lifted Britain’s State Immunities 
Act of 1978, which had frozen the common law as it existed in Hong Kong in 
1978.76 After July 1, 1997, the PRC did not propose any legislation to fill the 
statutory void that the State Immunity Act of 1978 once filled. Therefore, the court 
reasoned, when Hong Kong transferred back to China, it also transferred back to 
                                                 
69 Id. at ¶ 261.  
70 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 262. 
71 Id. at ¶ 121. 
72 Id. at ¶ 118. 
73 Id. at ¶ 266. 
74 Id. at ¶ 118. 
75 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 78. 
76 Id. at ¶ 78. 
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its common law.77 As a common law jurisdiction, then, FG Hemisphere Associates 
could enforce its award against the DRC in Hong Kong.78  
 
V.  WHETHER AGREEING TO ARBITRATION CONSTITUTED A WAIVER OF 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
 Hemisphere argued that the doctrine of immunity did not ultimately matter 
because the Democratic Republic of the Congo waived access to immunity when it 
agreed to arbitration under the rules of the ICC.79 In general, the court agreed with 
this premise; especially when the arbitrator “is not an organ of the state.”80 At 
common law, however, the implied waiver of immunity only applied to 
jurisdiction, not the execution of the judgment.81 The court reasoned that the 
common law, “at least in England, was that waiver (for the execution of the 
judgment) was only effective if it was express and in the face of the court.”82 
 The court conceded that the issue of sovereignty was the deciding factor, 
holding that, “[i]t is common ground in this case that the New York Convention 
applies to the awards made in favour of the plaintiff and that, subject to the 
question of sovereign immunity, they are enforceable in Hong Kong.”83 Under the 
rules of the ICC, Article 28(6) states: 
 
Every award shall be binding on the parties. By submitting 
the dispute to arbitration under these rules, the parties 
undertake to carry out any award without delay and shall be 
                                                 
77 Id. at ¶ 80. 
78 Id. at ¶ 81. 
79 Id. at ¶ 125. 
80 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 127.  
81 Id. at ¶ 129. 
82 Id. at ¶ 130. 
83 Id. at ¶ 152. 
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deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse 
insofar as such waiver can validly be made.84 
 
Hemisphere argued that Article 28(6) bound the DRC to the decision of the 
tribunal and waived any right to immunity.85 But Justice Stock discounted 
Hemisphere’s reliance on the Rules of the ICC. Hong Kong’s return to a common 
law jurisdiction following the transfer of power to China required express waiver 
of immunity.86 Justice Stock cited to Creighton Limited v. Government of Qatar 
(tried in the United States).87 There, like here, a private entity attempted to enforce 
an award against a foreign state. Similarly, the foreign state had agreed to arbitrate 
in a state that had signed the New York Convention, along with the forum state, 
but the foreign state itself was not a party to the Convention.88  
 The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found no waiver 
where the allegedly waiving state is not a signatory to the New York Convention: 
 
Qatar not having signed the Convention, we do not think that 
its agreement to arbitrate in a signatory country, without 
more, demonstrates the requisite intent to waive its sovereign 
immunity in the United States. As Creighton directs us to no 
other evidence of such an intent, we hold that [s.] 1605(a)(1) 
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the district 
court.89 
 
                                                 
84 Id. at ¶ 153; ICC, Art. 28(6). 
85 FG Hemisphere at ¶ 153. 
86 Id. at ¶ 164. 
87 Id. at ¶ 165 (citing Creighton Ltd v. Government of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (DC 
Cir 1999)). 
88 Id. at ¶ 165. 
89 Id. at ¶ 168, (citing Creighton Ltd., 181 F.3d at 123). 
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In agreeing with this outcome, Vice President Stock mentioned the maxim pacta 
tertiis, as “reflected in art. 34 of the Vienna Convention: ‘A treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.’”90 
 Judge Yeung, in his dissent, came to the same conclusion, but for different 
reasons. Judge Yeung presented a number of cases that adopted the rule that 
“submission to arbitration does not constitute a waiver of state immunity.”91   
 All three judges agreed that the DRC did not waive its rights to sovereign 
immunity when it agreed to arbitration under the rules of the ICC.92 While the ICC 
specifies that by agreeing to arbitrate the state is waiving immunity from 
jurisdiction, it does not apply that waiver to the execution of judgment.93 Under the 
common law of Hong Kong, the foreign state must expressly waive its right to 
immunize itself against an award.94 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 FG Hemisphere v. The Democratic Republic of the Congo will prove to be 
a seminal case in assisting future courts deciding on issues of sovereign immunity. 
This case resolves the debate over whether the doctrine of restrictive immunity is 
customary international law. This has significantly leveled the playing field for 
private entities attempting enforce arbitral awards against states not party to the 
New York Convention. This alone could have a wide-ranging impact, giving 
would-be investors the confidence to invest in developing countries. 
                                                 
90 FG Hemisphere at ¶170. 
91 Id. at ¶ 230. (relying upon Duff Development Co. v. Government of Kelantan [1924] 
A.C. 797; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore [1984] 1 QB 149;  Kahan v Pakistan Federation 
[1951] 2 KB 1003). 
92 Id. at ¶ 177. 
93 Id. at ¶ 129. 
94 Id. at ¶ 164. 
